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Abstract 
The Finnish government proposed the domestic help services (DHS) tax credit at the first time in 1997. The government had many 
reasons for introducing the tax credit. One of the motivations was to increase demand of services in tax credited industries. The 
Finnish domestic help services tax credit system has been changed many times between 2001 and 2014. In this thesis I 
concentrate on the reforms in 2009 and 2012. I examine the effects of these reforms on demand for and consumer prices of 
services.  
 
Theory of tax incidence predicts that a reduction of the domestic help services tax credit should decrease consumer prices and 
therefore also change demand for services. I apply a regression differences-in-differences (DD) method to investigate the theory 
prediction on demand for services. I use Finnish firms as a treatment group and Swedish firms as a control group. I utilize firms’ 
value added tax (VAT) exclusive turnover to estimate the quantities of purchased services. The key assumption of the DD 
approach is that the treatment group and the control group have similar turnover trends in the absence of the treatment. This 
assumption is fulfilled in my analysis. The results on turnover vary between years. The results of the DHS tax credit reform in 2012 
indicate that firms’ turnover reduced from 1.09 % to 2.32 % depending on firms’ location and industry. The results then support the 
theory predictions. On the other hand, the results of the reform in 2009 are not statistically significant. 
 
To analyze the price responses, I exploit the fixed effects (FE) method which answers the question: Do the consumer prices of 
services change due to the reform or do they change anyway despite the reform? The estimation results of price responses show 
that the DHS tax credit reduction in 2012 increased consumer prices of cleaning services by 2.1 % just after the reform in the 
beginning of 2012 and by 5.3 % about year after the reform. Thus the results do not respond to theory predictions of tax incidence.  
 
I have comprehensive data from Finnish and Swedish Tax Administration. Data contains all firms liable for VAT at the monthly level 
and income declaration data of firms and the DHS tax credit applications data at the yearly level. Data covers years from 2006 to 
2013. I also use the survey data of consumer prices of cleaning services in the analysis of price responses. 
 
This study contributes previous literature of the DHS tax credit by conducting the first econometric analysis of the Finnish tax credit 
system which uses the DD approach and both Finnish and Swedish data. However, I cannot provide any policy recommendations 
because the quality of my empirical results is not sufficient. 
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Tiivistelmä 
Suomen hallitus esitti kotitalousvähennystä ensimmäisen kerran vuonna 1997. Hallitus perusteli kotitalousvähennyksen 
käyttöönottoa useilla syillä. Yhtenä syynä oli lisätä palveluiden kysyntää kotitalousvähennykseen oikeuttavilla toimialoilla. 
Kotitalousvähennysjärjestelmää on muutettu useaan kertaan vuosien 2001 ja 2014 aikana. Tutkielmassani keskityn vuoden 2009 
ja 2012 muutoksiin. Tutkin näiden muutoksien vaikutuksia kuluttajahintoihin ja palveluiden kysyntään.  
 
Verokohtaannon teoria ennustaa, että kotitalousvähennyksen pienentämisen pitäisi laskea kuluttajahintoja ja siten myös muuttaa 
palveluiden kysyntää. Hyödynnän ero eroissa (DD) menetelmää tutkiakseni pitääkö teorian ennustukset palveluiden kysynnästä 
paikkansa. Käytän suomalaisia yrityksiä koeryhmänä ja ruotsalaisia yrityksiä verrokkiryhmänä. Estimoin ostettujen palveluiden 
määrää käyttämällä yritysten verotonta liikevaihtoa tulosmuuttujana. Ero eroissa menetelmän tärkein oletus on, että ilman 
muutosta koe- ja kontrolliryhmien liikevaihdot noudattavat yhtenäistä trendiä. Oletus täyttyy tutkimuksessani. Tulokset verottoman 
liikevaihdon analyysista eivät ole yksiselitteiset. Tulokset osoittavat, että vuoden 2012 kotitalousvähennyksen muutos laski 
yritysten verotonta liikevaihtoa 1.09–2.32 % riippuen yrityksen sijainnista ja toimialasta. Siten tulokset tukevat teoriaa. Toisaalta 
vuoden 2009 kotitalousvähennyksen muutoksen tutkimustulokset eivät ole tilastollisesti merkitseviä. 
 
Hyödynnän kiinteiden vaikutusten (FE) menetelmää analysoidakseni kotitalousvähennyksen vaikutuksia palveluiden 
kuluttajahintoihin. Menetelmän avulla pystyn vastaamaan kysymykseen: Onko muutos kotitalousvähennyksessä vaikuttanut 
palveluiden kuluttajahintoihin vai olisivatko kuluttajahinnat muuttuneet joka tapauksessa? Tutkimukseni tulokset osoittavat, että 
kotitalousvähennyksen pienentäminen vuonna 2012 nosti siivouspalveluiden kuluttajahintoja 2.1 % heti muutoksen jälkeen 
alkuvuonna 2012 ja 5.3 % noin vuosi muutoksen jälkeen. Siten tutkimukseni tulokset eivät vastaa verokohtaannon teorian 
ennustuksia.  
 
Tutkimuksessani käytän kattavaa Suomen ja Ruotsin veroviranomaisilta saatua aineistoa. Aineisto sisältää kaikki yritysten 
arvonlisäverotustiedot kuukausitasolla ja yritysten ja kotitalousvähennyshakemusten veroilmoitustiedot vuositasolla. Aineisto kattaa 
vuodet 2006–2013. Hyödynnän myös siivouspalveluiden kuluttajahinnoista koottua kyselyaineistoa tutkiessani hintavaikutuksia. 
 
Tutkimukseni kontribuoi aiempaa kotitalousvähennyskirjallisuutta toteuttamalla ensimmäisen ekonometrisen analyysin Suomen 
kotitalousvähennysjärjestelmästä käyttäen DD menetelmää ja sekä Suomen että Ruotsin aineistoa. En voi kuitenkaan antaa 
mitään politiikkasuosituksia tutkimukseni perusteella, koska empiiristen tulosten laatu ei ole riittävä. 
Avainsanat  
verokohtaanto 
verovähennys uudistus 
ero eroissa menetelmä 
kysyntäanalyysi 
kotitalousvähennys 
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1 Introduction
Could governments aﬀect the demand for services by using tax instruments? Do con-
sumer prices change because of a tax instrument? These kinds of questions lie at the
center of public economics. One purpose of public economics is to analyze government
policy. Government policies can cause distortions in society and aﬀect negatively or pos-
itively citizens' lives. Therefore studies of government policies can provide important
information about how the policies aﬀect people's lives.
Policy reforms oﬀer researchers a possibility to explore the eﬀects of government
policy. In recent years there has been an increasing interest to study the eﬀects of
policy reforms as natural experiments. Quasi-experimental methods have been used,
for instance, in studies of value added tax (VAT) reforms (e.g. Kosonen, 2015) and
employment subsidies or minimum wage reforms (e.g. Betcherman et al., 2010; Card
& Krueger, 1994). In this thesis I aim to provide an empirical analysis of the eﬀects of
the Finnish tax credit reform on the demand for and consumer prices of services.
The Finnish government put in place a tax instrument, the domestic help services
(DHS) tax credit1, for the ﬁrst time in 1997. Many reasons motivated the introduction
of the domestic help services tax credit (HE 85/1997, HE 140/2000). The government
wanted to increase the demand for domestic help services and improve households'
opportunities to employ workers at home. Other motivations of the DHS tax credit
were to reduce the shadow economy, inﬂuence labor supply and demand, encourage
small entrepreneurs in tax credited industries and support house renovations. This
thesis focuses on the government's motivation to increase the demand for domestic help
services. In particular, this thesis attempts to answer to following questions: Does
the domestic help services tax credit aﬀect consumer prices of services and increase or
decrease the demand for services?
Finland is not the only country which has implemented the domestic help services
tax credit. The DHS tax credit is or has been in use also in Austria, Belgium, Denmark,
France, Germany, Italy and Sweden (SOU 2008:57). France was the ﬁrst country to
introduce one form of the domestic help services tax credit in 1991 (Flipo et al., 2007).
After that, in the 1990s, the domestic help services tax credit was in use at least in
Denmark, Finland and Sweden. In the 2000s, the domestic help services tax credit
was introduced also in other countries and, for instance, in Sweden the government
included more services to the system. Moreover, the Finnish government has changed
1The Finnish term is kotitalousvähennys and the Swedish term is husavdrag
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the domestic help services tax credit system several times in the period 2001-2014.
In this study I concentrate on the Finnish and Swedish DHS tax credit systems since
both countries' systems are organized similarly. In Finland and Sweden, the domestic
help services tax credit is a form of tax credit, which is provided to the consumers in
their personal taxation. Consumers can apply the DHS tax credit for labor costs of
services, such as renovation, cleaning and childcare. The domestic help services tax
credited work has to be done at applicant's apartment and the DHS tax credit is not
provided if the work is done by the applicants themselves.
In this thesis I utilize the changes in the Finnish DHS tax credit system to analyze
the eﬀects of the DHS tax credit on the demand for and consumer prices of services.
I am especially interested in the changes made in the Finnish DHS tax credit system
in 2009 and 2012. In 2009, the total maximum amount of the DHS tax credit was
increased from 1150-2300 euros to 3000 euros. In 2012, it was decreased from 3000
euros to 2000 euros and the percentage amount of the DHS tax credit was decreased
from 60 % to 45 % of labor costs.
The changes in the Finnish DHS tax credit system can be interpreted as shocks
to ﬁrms. Therefore I apply a regression diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences (DD) method. I use
Finnish ﬁrms as a treatment group and Swedish ﬁrms as a control group. Thus I
compare the Finnish ﬁrms' value added tax exclusive turnover against to the Swedish
ﬁrms' turnover in DHS tax credited industries.
The main identifying assumption of the DD method is that the treatment group and
the control group have similar turnover trends without a treatment. Finland and Swe-
den have similar economic and cultural characteristics, such as labor laws and working
conditions. Therefore ﬁrms face the similar business environments in both countries.
Hence it is reasonable to assume that turnover trends are similar in the absence of the
treatment. The graphical analysis of turnover trends illustrates that trends are simi-
lar before the DHS tax credit reforms and the main identifying assumption of the DD
approach is fulﬁlled.
I use wide ﬁrm-level data from both Finnish and Swedish Tax Administrations to
estimate the eﬀects of the DHS tax credit reform on the demand for services. Both
Finnish and Swedish data contains all ﬁrms liable for VAT at the monthly level and
income declaration data of ﬁrms and the DHS tax credit applications data at the yearly
level. Data sets cover years from 2006 to 2013. The monthly level data includes the
ﬁrm's VAT payments of sales from which I calculate ﬁrms' VAT exclusive turnover. I ex-
ploit Finnish and Swedish ﬁrms' VAT exclusive turnover and estimated price responses
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to analyze the eﬀects of the DHS tax credit reform on the quantities of purchased
services.
Despite the comprehensive data of ﬁrms, I do not have available consumer price data
of cleaning services from Sweden, because Tax Administration data does not contains
any information about the consumer prices. I have consumer price survey data only
from Finnish cleaning ﬁrms before and after the reform in 2012. Therefore I cannot
apply a regression DD approach for analyzing the price responses. Instead I investigate
price responses of the DHS tax credit reform using the ﬁxed eﬀects (FE) method. The
ﬁxed eﬀects estimation provides an answer to the question: Do the consumer prices of
services change due to the reform or do they change anyway in spite of the reform?
The theory of tax incidence implies that the reduction of domestic help services tax
credit should reduce consumer prices. My empirical results of price responses show that
the DHS tax credit reduction in 2012 increased consumer prices of cleaning services by
2.1 % just after the reform in the beginning of 2012 and by 5.3 % a year after the reform.
Thus the results are not in accordance with the theory predictions of tax incidence.
I analyze the impact of the DHS tax credit reforms in 2009 and 2012 on VAT
exclusive turnover in three diﬀerent approaches. First, I estimate the eﬀects on turnover
in all DHS tax credited industries together. Second, I investigate the main DHS tax
credited industries, construction and cleaning industries, separately. Third, I divide
ﬁrms in two groups depending on ﬁrms' location, i.e. ﬁrst group contains ﬁrms which
are located in the capital and second group those who are not.
The empirical results of turnover are not similar in the reforms. I show that the DHS
tax credit reform in 2012 has reduced on turnover from 1.09 % to 2.32 % depending on
ﬁrms location and industry. However, the results on cleaning ﬁrms' turnover are not
statistically signiﬁcant which indicates that the DHS tax credit reform has no impact
on cleaning ﬁrms' turnover. Nevertheless, the results of the reform in 2012 are in line
with the theory which implies that a reduction of the DHS tax credit should decrease
the demand for services. Since consumer prices of cleaning services increase after the
reform and VAT exclusive turnover decrease or does not change, quantities sold have to
decline after the reform which indicate that the demand for services is decreased. The
results of the reform in 2009 are not statistically signiﬁcant and turnover trends are
more messy in the time period than in 2011-2012 which complicated the interpretation.
Moreover, I do not have the results of price responses of the reform in this period.
Therefore I cannot reach any conclusions of the impact of the DHS tax credit reform
in 2009.
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My results contribute to the scarce literature on the tax credit reforms. To the best
of my knowledge, there are hardly any studies of the eﬀects of the domestic help tax
credit system, which have done analyses with econometric methods and using Finnish
data. Moreover, the diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences approach has not been utilized in the
previous literature of the DHS tax credit. The previous studies of the Finnish DHS tax
credit system have mainly focused on descriptive analyses about who uses the domestic
help services tax credit and how much (e.g. Häkkinen Skans 2011; Lith 2011). The
only econometric research about the eﬀects of the domestic help services tax credit on
the demand have done by Flipo et al. (2007). They studied the French DHS tax credit
system with econometric simulation models. Their simulation results indicate that if
the tax credit were to increase by 10 %, the 13.5 % of households who do not consume
domestic services would use them after the increase.
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows. Section 2 presents previous literature
and theory predictions of the changes in the DHS tax credit. Section 3 presents the
institutional background in Finland and Sweden. Section 4 describes data and macroe-
conomic background and presents empirical strategy of this study. Section 5 presents
the results of price responses and demand analyses and the discussion of the results.
Finally, Section 6 concludes the thesis.
2 Literature Review
2.1 Theory
In this section, I present the theory of tax incidence and its predictions to the DHS tax
credit. Furthermore, I show how the DHS tax credit can theoretically impact on the
consumer prices and the demand for services. In my analysis I follow the theory of tax
incidence by Kotlikoﬀ & Summers (1987).
The theory of tax incidence implies that the DHS tax credit aﬀects consumer prices,
because it directly decreases prices, which consumers pay for services. I analyze demand
and price eﬀects as a shift in the demand curve, because consumers apply the DHS tax
credit in their personal income taxation. I assume that the supply curve is unchanged.
Uusitalo (2005) showed that the DHS tax credit only shifts the demand curve and not
the supply curve. In the end of this section, I discuss the possibility of change in the
supply curve as well.
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Figure 1 visualizes the eﬀects of the DHS tax credit to the demand curve. Before
introducing the DHS tax credit, equilibrium is at point E0, with quantity q0 and price
p0. The consumer price with value added tax is p0 = φ(1 + t), where a producer price
is φ and VAT is t. The demand curve shifts up exactly by τ , which is the DHS tax
credit. The consumer price p0 increases to p1 and new equilibrium is now on the point
E1. After the DHS tax credit consumers pay a price p1 − τ and quantity increases to
q1. The vertical distance between the old and new demand curve is the amount of the
DHS tax credit τ . Thus demand eﬀects depend on the amount of the DHS tax credit
and the elasticities of demand and supply.
Q
P S
D0
D1p0
q0
p1
q1
p1 − τ
τ
E0
E1
Figure 1: The tax incidence of the DHS tax credit
The theory of tax incidence implies that the changes in the DHS tax credit should
shift consumer prices. I use the partial equilibrium analysis of tax incidence to de-
termine price eﬀects of the change in the DHS tax credit. In order to use the partial
equilibrium analysis, I have to assume that the market is relatively small versus entire
economy. This assumption is reasonable because the DHS tax credit can apply only for
certain industries' services and not for all services in every industries.
The economy without taxation is in equilibrium, when demand and supply equals,
D(p0) ≡ S(p0), (1)
where p0 is the equilibrium price without the tax credit τ . By introducing the tax credit
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τ , the equilibrium changed to
D(p1 − τ) ≡ S(p1), (2)
where p1 is the price with VAT. Figure 1 shows the impact of the DHS tax credit to
equilibrium. The consumer pays the price p1 − τ and the producer sells at the price p1
after introducing the tax credit τ .
I exploit equilibrium condition (2) to study tax or price incidence of the DHS tax
credit. I begin with analyzing how the change in the DHS tax credit τ aﬀects the
consumer prices p1. By diﬀerentiating the equilibrium condition (2) with respect to τ :
dp1
dτ
D(p1 − τ) = dp1
dτ
S(p1) =⇒ D′(p1 − τ)(dp1
dτ
− 1) = dp1
dτ
S ′(p1). (3)
I assume that the DHS tax credit τ is zero,
D′(p1 − τ)(ρ− 1) = ρS ′(p1) =⇒ ρD′ −D′ = ρS ′
=⇒ D′ = (D′ − S ′)ρ =⇒ ρ = D
′
D′ − S ′ ,
(4)
where D′ = dD(p1−τ)
dp1
, S ′ = dS(p1)
dp1
and ρ ≡ dp1/dτ , which is deﬁned as a pass-through
rate (Weyl & Fabinger, 2013).
Weyl & Fabinger (2013) introduced the pass-through ρ as an economic tool, which
is determined by the elasticities of demand and supply. Therefore I also derive the pass-
through using the elasticity of demand  = dD(p1−τ)
dp1
p1−τ
D
and the elasticity of supply
η = dS(p1)
dp1
p1
S
.
Assuming that the DHS tax credit is zero, the elasticity of demand is  = D′ p1
D
and
the elasticity of supply is η = S ′ p1
S
. Because demand and supply are in the equilibrium
condition (2) and equation (4) is multiplied by p1/D, the pass-through ρ is
ρ =

− η . (5)
The equation (5) is the standard representation of tax incidence (Marion & Muehlegger,
2011; Weyl & Fabinger, 2013). Weyl & Fabinger (2013) deﬁne the pass-through as a
sum which pass to consumer when tax or cost is applied.
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Therefore price incidence of the DHS tax credit depends on the elasticities of demand
and supply, when the markets are perfectly competitive (Kotlikoﬀ & Summers, 1987;
Salanié, 2003). Whereas under a general model of symmetric imperfect competition,
the pass-through diﬀerentiates from the perfect competition pass-through by a conduct
parameter, θ = [(p −mc)/p]. In the conduct parameter, p is the consumer price, mc
represents the producer's marginal cost and  is the elasticity of demand. The conduct
parameter varies between zero and one, depending on the degree of the competition.
Naturally, under the perfect competition it equals to zero and under the monopoly it
equals to one (Weyl & Fabinger, 2013). Hence the elasticities of demand and supply
aﬀect the pass-through also under the imperfect competition.
The elasticity of demand aﬀects more the pass-through if ﬁrms have some market
power because the conduct parameter is larger than zero. Consumers can apply the
domestic help services tax credit, for instance, to cleaning and renovation services. The
markets of cleaning and renovation industries can diﬀer from each other. I assume that
cleaning ﬁrms have little market power since, in average, cleaning ﬁrms are quite small
and there is a large number of cleaning ﬁrms in Finland. Therefore the market is almost
perfectly competed and the DHS tax credit should have the impact close to what theory
implies. Instead, in the construction and engineering industries, e.g. renovation sector,
theory implications are not necessarily valid since ﬁrms can diﬀerentiate more easily
and some ﬁrms may have more market power than other. The change in the DHS tax
credit then does not possible have impact on the demand as the theory implies.
The elasticities of demand and supply also aﬀect on quantities purchased. Theory
of price elasticity implies that if demand is almost inelastic, the price change does not
have large impact on quantities purchased and vice versa if demand is very elastic. In
Figure 1 I visualize the eﬀect of the DHS tax credit on prices with almost equally elastic
demand and supply. The pass-through to consumer prices is then about half of the full
pass-through. The pass-through to consumer prices is near to full if demand is almost
inelastic and supply is very elastic (  η). Conversely, the pass-through is close to
zero if demand is very elastic and supply is close to inelastic ( η).
Consequently, the theory of tax incidence implies that if consumer prices change,
quantities purchased can also change. Therefore without the change in consumer prices
there cannot be any change in demand. According to theory, the reduction of the DHS
tax credit should decrease consumer prices. Figure 2 shows the eﬀects of the reduction
of the DHS tax credit. Before the reduction the price is p1. Then the government
reduces the DHS tax credit from τ1 to τ2. The demand shifts down due to the smaller
7
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Figure 2: The change in the DHS tax credit
tax credit and consumers pay a price p2 − τ2, which is larger than the price p1 − τ1
before the reduction. Also the consumer price decreased to p2. The quantity sold drops
from q1 to q2. Thus if the consumer price do not change due to reduction of the DHS
tax credit, demand cannot change either.
In the beginning of this section, I assume that supply does not change due to the tax
credit. The assumption is based on the information that in Finland consumers apply
the DHS tax credit in their personal income taxation. Instead, in Sweden buyers of
services get the DHS tax credit directly, when they purchase services. The details of
the both countries' DHS tax credit systems are presented in Section 3. Because of the
institutional diﬀerences, Swedish ﬁrms can possibly easier adjust prices due to the DHS
tax credit, since a buyer only pays half of the price of services to the ﬁrm. In Sweden
supply of services can also change, not only the demand.
Moreover, the institutional diﬀerences between Finland and Sweden can also af-
fect the demand curve. The consumer's preferences for purchasing services determine
the demand curve. Finnish consumers can have diﬀerent preferences than Swedish
consumers. The Swedish tax credit system enables Swedish consumers allocate more
consumption for today since they do not have to pay a full price of services. While in
Finland the claim of the DHS tax credit is done even a year and half later than the
services is purchased. Finnish consumers pay the full price of services and hence they
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have a smaller budget for consumption. Therefore the consumer's budget constraint is
diﬀerent in Finland and Sweden and the preferences for consumption diﬀer from each
other.
In consequence of the institutional diﬀerences, tax incidence of the DHS tax credit
could be diﬀerent in Sweden and Finland. The diﬀerence in tax incidence between
countries is not a problem because the Swedish system has been unchanged in the
period I am focusing on.
The DHS tax credit can also cause spillover eﬀects to other industries. The DHS tax
credit reduces prices of the tax credited services. Therefore consumers have more budget
to spend in other services. Also the possible spillover eﬀect can be larger in Sweden
than in Finland, because Swedish consumers get the tax credit directly. Conversely,
the DHS tax credit can have negative impact on the demand for the substitutes of
the DHS tax credited services, for instance food delivery and complementary building
and building an addition. Thus the demand for tax credited services can increase at
the expense of other non-tax credited services. All these possible spillover eﬀects are
depending on the consumers' behavior. Moreover, the interest rate and inﬂation can
also aﬀect the size of spillover eﬀects, because in Finland consumers receive the sum of
the DHS tax credit next year from purchased at the earliest.
Other possible external eﬀects of the DHS tax credit are based on ﬁrms' behavior.
The ﬁrms can increase supply of services in the DHS tax credited industries or these
industries can attract more new ﬁrms to enter the business. These new ﬁrms are
then absent from other industries. Moreover, in the DHS tax credited industries ﬁrms
can have incentives to shift material costs to labor costs, in which case the demand
eﬀects can be distorted. As a consequence, the general eﬀects of the DHS tax credit
on demand can diﬀer from the demand eﬀects of the speciﬁc industry. Furthermore,
the DHS tax credit can also increase lobbing activity of substitutes services industries
(Häkkinen Skans, 2011). Hence it can raise the political pressure to accept these services
in the DHS tax credit.
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2.2 Previous Evidence
The previous empirical literature of the tax credits for consumers is thin. Especially, as
the DHS tax credit is not a widely used form of tax credit, there are only few previous
studies of the eﬀects of the DHS tax credit. The only econometric studies of the DHS
tax credit have been done by Flipo et al. (2007), Halldén & Stenberg (2013) and Öberg
(2005). Other previous studies have mainly concentrated on descriptive analyses of
the DHS tax credit applicants (e.g. Häkkinen Skans 2011; Lith 2011; Riksskatteverket
2011).
Häkkinen Skans (2011) and Lith (2011) describe the DHS tax credit systems in
Finland and Sweden. Häkkinen Skans (2011) discusses possible theory implications
of the DHS tax credit on demand and employment. She also focuses on describing
applicants of the DHS tax credit and from which services they apply the DHS tax credit.
Lith (2011) instead focuses on describing the production of domestic help services and
services providers' economic situations. Furthermore he discusses the impacts of DHS
tax credit to the shadow economy.
Grönberg & Rauhanen (2015) also discuss the Finnish and Swedish domestic help
services tax credit systems. The purpose of their study was to examine how much the
DHS tax credit is not applied or is not payed to pensioners, because of pensioners' tax
payments are not large enough to cover the total amount of the DHS tax credit.
While Tuovinen (2007) only describes the Finnish DHS tax credit system and dis-
cusses theoretically employment eﬀects of the DHS tax credit. In addition she reviews
the previous literature about the employment eﬀects of the DHS tax credit.
In previous literature there are hardly any econometric studies with comprehensive
data about the eﬀects of the DHS tax credit on demand and employment. Häkki-
nen Skans (2011) remarked in her paper that without detailed data about service
providers and applicants of the DHS tax credit, the estimation of the eﬀects of the
DHS tax credit cannot be done. Niilola et al. (2005) study the eﬀects of the DHS
tax credit on demand and employment in Finland using data which contains surveys
of households and domestic help services ﬁrms. They argued that the DHS tax credit
has had an impact on the demand for services and employment. Niilola et al. (2005)
calculate the employment eﬀects dividing the sales of services (in euros) by the eﬀec-
tiveness of work (in euros/person-year). As a result, they got the person-year quantity
of employments.
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However, Uusitalo (2005) claimed that the method used by Niilola et al. (2005) is
not valid, because it does not take into account the price eﬀects of the DHS tax credit
or control for the underlying development of employment and demand for services in
industries of domestic help services. Uusitalo (2005) argued that a reliable study cannot
be conducted without relevant data or comprehensive empirical analysis. He suggested
that the DHS tax credit should be studied with a natural experimental method, which
includes a treatment and control group.
The previous literature of the Swedish DHS tax credit system is also mainly focused
on descriptive analyses. The reports by Riksskatteverket (2011) and SOU (2008:57)
describe the Swedish DHS tax credit system. SOU (2008:57) also present the overview
of the other countries' domestic help services tax credit systems. While in the report
of Riksskatteverket (2011), the main purpose is to analyze how the Swedish DHS tax
credit system has aﬀected the shadow economy.
The Swedish domestic help services tax credit system have been studied also empiri-
cally. Öberg (2005) analyzes the eﬀects of the hypothetical DHS tax credit to the formal
and informal employment. She estimates, using a general equilibrium simulation, that
formal long-term employment increased by 0.07-0.45 percent of the labor force. Also
Halldén & Stenberg (2013) study the domestic help services tax credit empirically, but
they have a diﬀerent perspective than other researchers. They examine the Swedish
DHS tax credit system and its impact on female earnings with diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences
propensity score matching. The main idea in their study was to analyze female labor
supply and how the DHS tax credit shifts the household time constraint. However,
there are no studies of the eﬀects of the Swedish DHS tax credit system on the demand
for and consumer prices of services.
The only econometric research about the demand eﬀects of the DHS tax credit have
been done by Flipo et al. (2007). They studied the French DHS tax credit system with
econometric simulation models. They estimate the impact of the French tax reduction
for domestic work on the demand for services and employment. Their simulation results
show that if the tax reduction increases by 10 %, the 13.5 % of households would
consume domestic services after the increase even if they do not consume such services
before. Thus the results show that the demand for domestic help services is considerable
elastic in France. However, Flipo et al. (2007) argued that with their simulation models
and data, results show no employment eﬀects at the aggregate level. Instead, their study
shows that the increase of the tax reduction would reduce the use of undeclared work
and hence increase employment. Nevertheless, the study of Flipo et al. (2007) shows
11
only the simulation results of the increase of the domestic help services tax credit and
not any comparative analysis of the demand and employment eﬀects.
3 Institutional Background
In this section, I present the institutional background of the domestic help services tax
credit in Finland and Sweden respectively. Especially I focus on changes in the DHS
tax credit systems in both countries and diﬀerences in these changes. In general, the
DHS tax credit systems have organized almost similarly in both countries. The most
signiﬁcant diﬀerence between Finland and Sweden DHS tax credit systems is that in
Sweden consumers get the tax credit directly, when they buy the tax credited services
whereas in Finland consumers have to apply the tax credit in their personal income
taxation. Fortunately, the diﬀerence in the applying mechanism has not changed among
the period I focus on.
3.1 Finland
The Finnish government proposed the DHS tax credit for the ﬁrst time in 1997 (HE
85/1997). In 1997-2000 the DHS tax credit was experimented with two diﬀerent vari-
ants. The ﬁrst variant was a subsidy for ﬁrms, that oﬀered domestic help services, and
the second was a tax credit for households, which purchased services. The subsidy for
ﬁrms was in use in Western and Eastern Finland and the tax credit was applied in the
Province of Oulu, Lapland and Southern Finland.
The Finnish government had many motivations for introducing the DHS tax credit
(HE 85/1997, HE 140/2000). The ﬁrst was that the DHS tax credit could improve
households' opportunities to employ workers at home. The second was that the DHS
tax credit could increase the demand for domestic help services. Thus the government
wanted to inﬂuence labor demand and supply in the DHS tax credited industries. The
third was that if services are bought more from ﬁrms, it could reduce the shadow
economy, because people would not do work by themselves or use undeclared work. The
fourth was that the government wanted to encourage small entrepreneurs and health
care at home. The ﬁfth was that the government wanted to support house renovations.
The subsidy for ﬁrms was used more to buy domestic help services and the tax credit
more to buy house renovation services (Häkkinen Skans, 2011; Lith, 2011). Households
using the tax credit had better earnings on average than households using services of
12
subsidized ﬁrms (Häkkinen Skans, 2011; Lith, 2011). In 2001 the government terminated
the subsidy system and continued with the tax credit system. At the same time the tax
credit system was extended to the whole country. The main reason for terminating the
subsidy system was that it was administratively too burdensome (HE 140/2000). The
decision of termination was made without any evaluation of diﬀerences and eﬀectiveness
of these systems. After 2001 the tax credit system has changed many times. I present
the changes in the system in a more detailed manner later in this section.
Table 1: Examples of the DHS tax credited services in Finland
Domestic help:
Cleaning apartment Gardening Furniture assembly
Cooking Ironing and laundering Childcare and senior care
House renovations:
Painting Kitchen and bathroom renovation Patio construction
Plumbing and electricity works Installation of IT devices Installation of solar panels
DHS tax credited services are determined by the government. The DHS tax credit
can be applied for domestic help and health care services, which are done at home,
and house renovation services (HE 85/1997). In Table 12 I present some examples
of tax credited services. However, all domestic help services are not included in the
DHS tax credit. There are some restrictions from which kind of work the DHS tax
credit can be applied for. For instance, the DHS tax credit would not be granted for
health care services which have a zero percent tax rate. The tax credited services also
have to be bought from a natural person or a company and they have to carry out
at a taxpayer's apartment3 or an apartment where a taxpayer's close relative live (HE
146/2004). Applicants of the DHS tax credit cannot get the credit if they do the work
by themselves or with the help of a person who lives in the same apartment with the
applicant (HE 144/2006). Also the government's house renovation subsidies, vouchers
for health care services and some other subsidies for childcare or caring for close relatives
restrain the DHS tax credit (HE 144/2006, HE 133/2012).
The rules of the DHS tax credit have changed several times between 1997 and 2014.
These changes oﬀer possibilities to analyze the eﬀects of the DHS tax credit on various
outcomes. The government has changed the amount or other terms of the DHS tax
2The Finnish Tax Administration lists services in a more detailed manner in their website
https://www.vero.ﬁ/ﬁ-FI/Henkiloasiakkaat/Kotitalousvahennys/Taulukko_kysytyimmista_kotitalous
vahenny(9231)
3Both rental or owner-occupied ﬂat is accepted
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credit almost every year. Changes and details of the DHS tax credit are presented in
Table 2. Table 2 shows that the percentage amount and total maximum amount of
the DHS tax credit have changed many times between 2001 and 2014. Currently the
eﬀective maximum total amount of the DHS tax credit is 2400 euros or 45 % of labor
compensations. The own liability of a buyer is 100 euros. The DHS tax credit cannot
be handed from material costs or installations of domestic appliances. Therefore only
labor costs and hiring an employee at home are tax credited. If a household hires an
employee, the amount of the DHS tax credit is 15 % of a salary and all employer's social
security contributions (SSC) can be deducted in personal income taxation. Nowadays
the DHS tax credit can also be applied from a work of foreign ﬁrms and a work which
is done in other EU countries. (HE 87/2012, HE 105/2013)
In this study I focus on changes where the total maximum or percentage amount
of the DHS tax credit have increased or decreased. Table 2 shows that these kinds
of changes were in 2002, 2005, 2006, 2009, 2012 and 2014. I analyze the changes in
2009 and 2012, because I have data available only from 2006 to 2013. The change in
2012 is especially interesting since both the total maximum and percentage amount
decreased. The total maximum amount changed from 3000 euros to 2000 euros and
the percentage amount decreased from 60 % to 45 %. Also the percentage amount of
the DHS tax credit for hiring employee decreased from 30 % to 15 %. In 2009 only the
total maximum amount of the DHS tax credit increased from 2300 euros to 3000 euros
in household help services and from 1150 euros to 3000 euros in renovation services.
There were no changes in the percentage amount at that time.
3.2 Sweden
The Swedish government proposed the domestic help services tax credit at the ﬁrst time
in 1993 (Prop. 1992/93:150). The motivation of the DHS tax credit was to balance the
business cycle and also boost the building industry until 2005. The DHS tax credit was
called the ROT deduction4 and the buyer could apply it for labor costs of renovation5.
The DHS tax credit was 30 % of labor costs and the total maximum amount varied
between 5 000-35 000 SEK. The variation depended on the type of renovated house.
Housing types included an own apartment, a rental apartment or even a holiday home.
4ROT = Reparation och underhåll, Ombyggnad, Tillbyggnad (Renovation and building extension)
5The Tax Administration lists services in a more detailed manner in their webside
https://www.skatteverket.se/privat/fastigheterbostad/rotrutarbete/exempelparotarbete.106.
7afdf8a313d3421e9a9256b.html
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The own liability of the DHS tax credit was 2000 SEK. In 1995, 2000-2003 and 2006
there were no domestic help services tax credit in use.
The Swedish government motivated the introduction of the DHS tax credit in sev-
eral ways (Prop. 1992/93:150, Prop. 2006/07:94). In 1993, the main reason was to
temporarily balance the economy and boost the building sector in recession. The gov-
ernment wanted to reduce unemployment and also the shadow economy in the building
sector. Therefore the ROT deduction was in use in several years between 1993 and
2005. The government proposed the RUT deduction6 for household work in 2007. The
aim of the RUT deduction was to increase freedom of choice in labor markets. The
government wanted to develop more short-time employment and provide people more
options to arrange their family life and work. One of the goals was to improve sexual
equality, because the DHS tax credit relieves time from household work and women still
spend more time on doing them. The government also wanted to reduce the shadow
economy with RUT, because people often do household work by themselves and this
work does not show in gross domestic product (GDP) and other national accounting
based indices.
In the ﬁrst of July 2007 the government made the DHS tax credit permanent (Prop.
2006/07:94). Since 2007 the percentage amount of the DHS tax credit has been 50 %
of labor costs and the total maximum amount 50 000 SEK. The own liability of a buyer
is 1000 SEK. Until November 2008 the DHS tax credit was only the RUT deduction.
The RUT deduction can be applied for domestic help services, for instance cleaning,
childcare and gardening7. In December 2008 the ROT deduction was also included to
the DHS tax credit system (Prop. 2008/09:178). In July 2009 the government changed
the DHS tax credit application system to a direct invoicing system8 and hiring an
employee at an apartment became tax credited. There has not been any changes in the
total maximum and percentage amount of the DHS tax credit after 2007. Only changes
after 2009 have been that the paid homework assistance became tax credited in 2013
and that the direct invoicing system was improved in 2015 (Prop. 2012/13:14, Prop.
2014/15:10). Therefore from July 2007 the DHS tax credit system has been almost
unchangeable. Table 3 presents all changes and the system in a more detailed manner.
6RUT = Rengöring, Underhåll, Tvätt (Cleaning, nursing/caring, washing)
7The Tax Administration lists services in a more detailed manner in their web-
site https://www.skatteverket.se/privat/fastigheterbostad/rotrutarbete/exempelparutarbete.4.
2ef18e6a125660db8b080001424.html
8Fakturamodellsystemet. The direct incvoicing system, where the taxpayer get the tax discount
direct from the company from which she buy services.
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4 Data and Empirical Strategy
In this section, I describe the data and empirical strategy. First, I provide macroeco-
nomic background of Finland and Sweden. I visualize macroeconomic indicators and
their development in both countries. Second, I present data sets which I use in my em-
pirical analyses. I exploit mainly Tax Administration data from Finland and Sweden
but I also have the survey data from Finnish cleaning ﬁrms. And last, I present the
empirical strategy of this study.
4.1 Macroeconomic Background
In this section, I present macroeconomic indicators from Finland and Sweden. I compare
Finnish and Swedish ﬁrms in analyses and therefore also the countries' macroeconomic
conditions are of interest. If the trends of macroeconomic indicators are very diﬀerent
in Finland and Sweden, it is not reasonable to compare countries with each other. Both
Finland and Sweden are Nordic welfare states and societies are orderly in the same foun-
dation. Both countries have similar labor laws, working conditions, annual vacations
and cultural background. Therefore ﬁrms experience similar business environments in
both countries. Figure 3 shows that general economic and consumer price trends are
similar in both countries between 2005 and 2013, the period I am focusing on (OECD,
2015a,b,d). I study consumer price trends in more detailed manner in Section 5.1.
In econometric analyses my main variables of interest are ﬁrms' VAT exclusive
turnover and consumer prices. For that reason I am especially interested in the general
growth rate of the economy, the employment rate and consumer price index (CPI).
Figure 3a shows that the quarterly GDP growth has been similar in Finland and Sweden
in the period I am focusing on. The economic crisis in 2008-2009 aﬀected the quarterly
GDP growth more in Finland, but after the crisis growth trends have varied in similar
manner in both countries.
Figure 3b visualizes the employment rate trends in Finland and Sweden in 2005-
2015. The employment rate has similar trend in both countries, but in general Sweden
has a higher employment rate. Historically the employment rate in Sweden has been
always larger than in Finland and other developed countries, which explains the diﬀer-
ence between rates. However, the employment rate has increased after 2013 in Sweden
and in contrast it has decreased in Finland, but that is not a problem because I am
focusing on the changes in the DHS tax credit in 2009 and 2012.
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Figure 3: a) The quarterly GDP, b) employment rate and c) the consumer price index
growth rate in Finland and Sweden from 2005 to 2015. Vertical lines indicate the
reforms in Finland.
Figure 3c shows that annual consumer price index growth rates have been very
similar from 2005 to 2011 in Finland and Sweden. The CPI growth rate is a common
indicator for identifying inﬂation and deﬂation periods. Before the economic crisis in
2008-2009 inﬂation increases every year in both countries. As Figure 3c shows that
the economic crisis aﬀect the CPI growth rate in both countries and inﬂation slowed
down. Until 2012, there are no diﬀerences in CPI annual growth rates between Finland
and Sweden, but after that inﬂation has slowed down more rapidly in Finland than in
Sweden. In general Finland has recovered from the 2009 economic crisis slower than
Sweden as Figure 3a shows that the GDP growth rate has been negative more often in
Finland than in Sweden. Under the continuing economic downward inﬂation has fallen
close to zero in Finland in 2013. In Sweden inﬂation fell close to zero in 2015, most likely
because energy prices have decreased worldwide and interest rates on housing costs have
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been low which has increased households' savings and investments in housing at the
expense of the other consumption (OECD, 2015c). Overall, the quarterly GDP, annual
CPI growth rate and the employment rate trends have been similar in the period I am
focusing on. Therefore it is reasonable to compare Finland and Sweden with each other.
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Figure 4: The annual GDP growth rates in two industries a) construction and engi-
neering and b) services to buildings and landscape activities industries e.g. cleaning in
Finland and Sweden from 2005 to 2014. Vertical lines indicate the reforms in Finland.
In addition to presenting macroeconomic indicators from Finland and Sweden, I
show the annual GDP growth rates in two main industries of my research. In Figure
4a I present the GDP growth rates in construction and engineering industries in both
countries from 2005 to 2014 (OECD, 2016). Figure 4a shows that the construction
and engineering industries' growth rates have varied a lot, but in general growth rate
trends have been similar in both countries. Especially, in the period from 2007 to 2013
trends match to each other well. The 2009 economic crisis impacted on construction
and engineering industries equally in both countries. After 2013 Swedish households
have increased investments in housing which explains the diﬀerence in growth rates
between countries (OECD, 2015c).
In Figure 4b I present the GDP growth rates in services to buildings and landscape
activities industries, for instance cleaning industry, in both countries from 2005 to 2014.
Figure 4b shows that growth rate trends have similar characteristics although there
are more variation between countries than in construction and engineering industries.
However, the 2009 economic crisis has impacted on services to buildings and landscape
activities industries less than construction and engineering industries.
Overall, macroeconomic trends have been substantially similar in Finland and Swe-
den from 2006 to 2013, in the period I am focusing on. In this perspective, it is justiﬁed
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to use Swedish ﬁrms as a control group for Finnish ﬁrms.
4.2 Data Description
In this study, I exploit data from both Finnish and Swedish Tax Administrations. The
Finnish data contains all ﬁrms liable for VAT at the monthly level, income declaration
data of ﬁrms at the yearly level and all DHS tax credit applications at the yearly
level. The Swedish data includes every ﬁrm liable for VAT at the monthly level in
those industries which are relevant in my analysis. These industries are construction
and engineering (ISIC codes9 41-43, 71), retail trade (47), services to buildings and
landscape activities including cleaning (81), public administration and defence and
compulsory social security (84), human health and social work activities (87-88) and
other services activities (95-96). The Swedish data also contains income declaration
data of ﬁrms and the DHS tax credit applications at the yearly level. Both Finnish and
Swedish data cover years from 2006 to 2013.
For the price analysis, I use consumer price index data of Statistics Finland and
survey data which has been collected from Finnish cleaning ﬁrms at three diﬀerent
points of time: end of 2011 (t=1), beginning of 2012 (t=2) and end of 2012 or beginning
of 2013 (t=3). The details of the survey data are in Appendix A. Table 4 shows
the descriptive statistics for cleaning services prices. Price1 represents hourly price of
cleaning services from Monday to Wednesday, price2 hourly prices in Thursday and
Friday, price3 hourly prices in Saturday or smaller special cleaning services as washing
windows and price4 hourly prices in Sunday or larger and more timely special cleaning
as renovation cleaning. Table 4 present prices 1 to 4 in every time point (t=1,2,3) and
all prices 1-4 together in three time points. I use all prices 1 to 4 in the analysis of the
price eﬀects. Table 4 shows that means are almost same in all prices.
The Finnish Tax Administration data contains monthly level information about the
ﬁrm's VAT payments of sales and yearly level control variables, e.g. information about
municipal and industry classiﬁcation codes. I mainly focus on construction and engi-
neering (41-43, 71) and services to buildings and landscape activities including cleaning
industries (81) in my analysis. In the ﬁrst column of Table 5, I present the descrip-
tive statistics of Finnish ﬁrms' VAT exclusive turnover, labor costs and municipality in
9The group codes are classiﬁed by the two-digit industrial classiﬁcation, ISIC (=International Stan-
dard Industrial Classiﬁcation of All Economic Activities, Rev.4, more information on the webside
http://unstats.un.org/unsd/cr/registry/regcst.asp?Cl=27)
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Table 4: Descriptive statistics of cleaning services prices per hour (in euros)
Price Variable t=1 t=2 t=3 t=1-3
1=Monday to Wednesday Mean 32.66 32.83 34.41 33.24
N 170 158 139 467
2=Thursday to Friday Mean 35.84 36.45 37.84 36.65
N 122 114 102 338
3=Saturday Mean 35.54 36.38 38.01 36.57
N 98 91 82 271
4=Sunday Mean 37.02 37.81 38.74 37.81
N 87 82 75 244
Total (price1-price4) Mean 34.86 35.40 36.85 35.64
N 477 445 398 1320
those industries in 2007, 2010 and 2013. VAT exclusive turnover of ﬁrm is calculated
from ﬁrm's VAT payments by dividing VAT sum by the applicable VAT rate and then
sum all diﬀerent sums of VAT rates together. All the monetary variables are in eu-
ros. I eliminated the ﬁrms for which VAT exclusive turnover was over 1 300 000 euros.
These ﬁrms were the largest 0.5 % share of distribution of VAT exclusive turnover. The
elimination decreases standard deviations of ﬁrms and reduces outliers from data.
Table 5 shows that Finnish construction ﬁrms have larger mean of VAT exclusive
turnover and labor costs than cleaning ﬁrms in every year. However, standard de-
viations are large, which indicates that distributions of turnover and labor costs are
skewed. Table 5 also shows that turnover of construction and cleaning ﬁrms are smaller
in 2013 than in 2007 and 2010. About 30 % of all cleaning ﬁrms are located in the
capital. While only around 15 % of all construction ﬁrms are located in the capital. The
capital includes Helsinki, Espoo and Vantaa in Finland. The number of observations
in the construction industry has increased a lot from 595199 in 2007 to 890386 in 2013.
Whereas the number of observations in the cleaning industry was largest in 2007 and
in 2010 and 2013 it has been near to same.
For the DHS tax credit applications data, I collected information about the sum
of invoices, the number of applications per ﬁrm and type of work from Finnish Tax
Administration data, which contains the DHS tax credit applications from individual
taxpayers. All variables are at the yearly level. I pooled all years from 2006 to 2013
together and identiﬁed data to ﬁrm-level. Table 6 presents the descriptive statistics of
the DHS tax credit applications. Table 6 shows from which type of work the DHS tax
credit have been applied in years 2006-2013. The DHS tax credit have been applied
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Table 5: Descriptive statistics of ﬁrms in Finland and Sweden
Finland Sweden
Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev.
2007
Construction VAT exclusive turnover 25312.18 78461.90 43153.12 115777
(Fin N=595199, Swe N=542346) labor costs 80338.73 318994.20 201934.10 2885984
capital 0.14 0.35 0.26 0.44
Cleaning VAT exclusive turnover 13519.54 58897.93 24220.14 79862.34
(Fin N=711022, Swe N=197903) labor costs 71578.39 423829 138088 4991434
capital 0.31 0.46 0.29 0.45
2010
Construction VAT exclusive turnover 24665.55 79251.65 34683.38 108598.20
(Fin N=866109, Swe N=733154) labor costs 86923.18 387489.20 192624 2855896
capital 0.17 0.37 0.26 0.44
Cleaning VAT exclusive turnover 12203.42 52456.92 20340.27 71804.22
(Fin N=629473, Swe N=297635) labor costs 64016.69 426079.30 117350.90 3962648
capital 0.29 0.45 0.30 0.46
2013
Construction VAT exclusive turnover 19843.60 73663.29 23584.46 87584.75
(Fin N=890386, Swe N=1262332) labor costs 97553.70 428722.40 49792.62 679595.80
capital 0.15 0.36 0.26 0.44
Cleaning VAT exclusive turnover 11716.36 52210.52 12634.35 58025.32
(Fin N=633506, Swe N=640460) labor costs 66267.50 425062.10 20602.46 846719.30
capital 0.26 0.44 0.28 0.45
most for house renovation services, on an average 72.9 % of invoices and 62.8 % of
employee's wage applications. The second most applications where made from domestic
work, about 25 % and the rest of applications were from health care services and other
undeﬁned types of services. It has been more common to employ a worker at home
by self in health care services comparing to other services, where the amount of hiring
employee is almost same than buying a work from ﬁrms.
Table 6: Descriptive statistics of tax credit in 2006-2013 in Finland
Type of work Variable % of total N N Mean
House renovation invoice 72.9 3220297 3341.084
wage 62.8 81494 2743.429
Domestic work invoice 25.0 1103485 1212.476
wage 24.0 31194 4212.366
Health care services invoice 1.5 64780 3350.935
wage 12.6 16376 2043.997
Other types invoice 0.6 29527 2962.067
wage 0.6 714 4493.21
Total invoice 100.0 4418089 2807.043
wage 100.0 129778 3017.878
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The DHS tax credit applications data shows that between 2006 and 2013 there has
been changes in applications of the DHS tax credit. The data shows that the total
number of the DHS tax credit applications has been increased a lot after 2009. In 2009
the total maximum amount of the DHS tax credit increased from 1150-2300 euros to
3000 euros. For example in 2007 the total number of the DHS tax credit applications
was 367 542 and by contrast in 2011 it was 734 901. In 2012 the total maximum amount
of the DHS tax credit decreased to 2000 euros and applications drop to 657 479. Figure
5 presents the over time development of the quantity of applied DHS tax credits in
hundred thousands euros and the number of DHS tax credit applications in diﬀerent
types of work. Clearly, the number of DHS tax credit applications and their quantity
in euros has been the largest in house renovation in every year. Overall the quantity
and the number has grown between 2006 and 2013 in every types of work.
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Figure 5: The development of the DHS tax credit applications over time in Finland and
Sweden. Figures a) and c) present the quantity of applied DHS tax credits in hundred
thousands euros and b) and d) the number of the DHS tax credit applications.
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From the DHS tax credit application data I also collected information about indi-
vidual taxpayers, which have applied the DHS tax credit. Table 7 presents descriptive
statistics of the Finnish DHS tax credit applicants in 2013. The total number of obser-
vations is 389 859. Table 7 shows that applicants' yearly average wage is larger than
the Finnish yearly average wage in 201310. Also applicants' yearly average pension is
larger than the Finnish yearly average pension in 201311. Around half of the applicants
have capital incomes and 69 % of applicants have dividends and interest income. Over
half of the applicants have debt and the average amount of debt was 79333.45 euros.
Applicant's average age is 57 years and there are near to same amount of male and
female applicants. 22 % of applicants live in the capital. Overall the DHS tax credit
was applied more for buying services from ﬁrms than hiring an employee at home.
Table 7: Descriptive statistics of applicants in 2013 in Finland and Sweden
N Mean St. Dev.
Finland
Wage sum 248333 47063.58 48621.48
Pension 169221 25500.91 19896.58
Capital income 193131 12788.86 409782.30
Dividends and interest income 269317 5732.36 81795.62
Debts 218334 79333.45 204103.90
Age 389859 57.03 16.13
Male 389859 0.51 0.50
Metropolitan 389859 0.22 0.41
Quantity of the applied DHS tax credit 382928 5415.67 90639.27
Quantity of the applied DHS tax credit for hiring employee 12869 4015.15 8954.00
Sweden
Wage sum 1199700 39302.40 27862.22
Pension 686012 20458.17 13687.47
Dividends and interest income 1024815 1248.26 16945.91
Quantity of the applied DHS tax credit 789793 1202.03 1504.49
The Swedish Tax Administration data contains two diﬀerent data sets. The ﬁrst
data set contains monthly level information about the ﬁrm's VAT payments of sales and
yearly level control variables, e.g. information about municipal and industry classiﬁca-
tion codes. However, the Swedish VAT payments data contains fewer control variables
than the Finnish Tax Administration data. In the second column of Table 5, I present
10I calculated the yearly average wage from the monthly average wage. In 2013 it was 3284 euros
times 12,5 months = 41050 euros (OSF, 2013).
11I calculated the yearly average pension from the monthly average pension. In 2013 it was 1500
euros times 12 months = 18000 euros (OSF, 2014).
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the descriptive statistics of Swedish ﬁrms' VAT exclusive turnover, labor costs and mu-
nicipality in construction and cleaning industries in 2007, 2010 and 2013. I calculate
VAT exclusive turnover of ﬁrm from the ﬁrm's VAT payments in a similar manner than
from Finnish Tax Administration data. All the monetary variables are converted to eu-
ros from the Swedish currency, krona, using the exchange rate at 13 August 2015, which
was 1/9.4520 SEK/EUR. I also eliminated the ﬁrms for which VAT exclusive turnover was
over 1 500 000 euros. These ﬁrms were the largest 0.5 % share of distribution of VAT
exclusive turnover.
Table 5 shows that ﬁrms have larger turnover in average in construction than in
cleaning industries in every year. Swedish ﬁrms' turnover has decreased over time in
both industries. Standard deviations are large in both industries in Sweden, which
indicates that the distributions of ﬁrms' turnover and labor costs are skewed. Table 5
shows that in Sweden, ﬁrms are more intensively located in the capital than in Finland.
In Sweden about 30 % of all cleaning ﬁrms and 26 % of construction ﬁrms are located
in Stockholm, which I deﬁne as an only city in the capital in Sweden. Moreover, the
number of observations has increased substantially in both industries.
The second Swedish data set contains information about the DHS tax credit appli-
cations. The data is from Swedish Tax Administration and includes years 2007-2014.
The DHS tax credit data is at the ﬁrm-level, because Swedish ﬁrms can directly apply
the DHS tax credit for costumers using the direct invoicing system. The DHS tax credit
data contains the total sales (both labor and material costs) of ﬁrms and approved sum
of the DHS tax credit per ﬁrm at the yearly level. Table 8 presents descriptive statistics
of the DHS tax credit in Sweden. All values are in euros. The HUS deduction was used
in 2007-2010 and the average quantity of approved sum was 1363.27. The applications
made only 77740. Both RUT and ROT deduction was used in 2009-2014 and those
years the number of applications were increase near to 3 000 000 as total.
Table 8: Descriptive statistics of the DHS tax credit in Sweden
Type of deduction Variable N Mean St. Dev.
HUS deduction 2007-2010 approved sum 77740 1363.27 4119.77
total labor cost 77740 2483.12 287159.97
RUT deduction 2009-2014 approved sum 523 408 245.22 1763.72
total sales 53 629.18 8994.23 229581041
ROT deduction 2009-2014 approved sum 252156.90 367.45 832.66
total sales 251776.77 2406.46 801562.74
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Figure 5 visualizes the development of DHS tax credit applications. The quantity
and number of ROT deduction applications are substantially larger than RUT or HUS
deduction applications. The number of applications of RUT and ROT deduction has
increased every year. In 2009 the number of applications was under 200 000 and in
2014 the number was already over 500 000. There has not been any large changes in
the Swedish DHS tax credit system during these years and also the total maximum
amount of the DHS tax credit has been the same, 50 000 SEK per applicant, which is
5289.89 euros using the exchange rate at 13 August 2015.
The Swedish data does not contain as much information about the DHS tax credit
applicants as the Finnish data. There are only few same variables in data. Table 7
presents descriptive statistics of Swedish applicants in 2013. I convert all monetary
variables to euros using the same exchange rate than earlier. The total number of
observation in this data is 1 708 540. Table 7 shows that applicants' average yearly
wage is slightly smaller than the Swedish average yearly wage in 201312. The DHS
tax credit applicants' yearly average pension is almost the same than Swedish yearly
average pension in 2012-201413. Large share of applicants have dividends and interest
income. The average sum of applied tax credits was 1202.03 euros in 2013.
4.3 Empirical Strategy
The empirical strategy of my study is to use a natural experimental method to esti-
mate the demand and price eﬀects of the changes in the DHS tax credit. The changes
in the Finnish DHS tax credit system in 2009 and 2012 can be interpreted as natu-
rally occurring shocks to ﬁrms. By contrast there is no changes in the Swedish tax
credit system in those years. In this section, I ﬁrst describe a ﬁxed eﬀects method
which I use to estimate the price eﬀects. Second, I show how turnover can be used
as an outcome variable for the estimation of demand. Third, I present a regression
diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences method for analyzing the eﬀect of the DHS tax credit reforms
on the demand for services. The estimation methodologies, a ﬁxed eﬀects (FE) and
regression diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences (DD) method, are provided in several microecono-
metrics textbooks (e.g. Angrist & Pischke, 2009; Cameron & Trivedi, 2005). In general
12I calculated the average yearly wage from average monthly wage. In 2013 it was 30600 SEK times
12,5 months = 382500 SEK which is 40467.63 in euros (SCB, 2015a).
13I calculated the average yearly pension from average monthly pension. In 2012-2014 it was around
16248-16269 SEK times 12 months = 194 976-195 228 SEK, which is 20628.02-20654.68 in euros
(Pensionsmyndigheten, 2015, 2016).
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I follow the textbook Mostly Harmless Econometrics: An Empiricist's Companion by
Angrist & Pischke (2009).
In the analysis of price eﬀects I exploit the ﬁxed eﬀects method. An ideal situation
would be that I could use the diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences approach. However, I have only
available data which contains information about consumer prices of cleaning services
in Finland. Therefore I do not have an appropriate control group which to use in the
analysis. Instead, I apply a ﬁxed eﬀects model to estimate the eﬀects of the DHS
tax credit reform on consumer prices of services. The ﬁxed eﬀects estimation allows
to separate the eﬀects of the reform from other unobserved underlying causes of price
changes.
The key idea behind the ﬁxed eﬀects model is that the observed outcome variable
Yit is either Y0it or Y1it, depending on the reform. I assume that
E[Y0it|Ai, t, Dit] = E[Y0it|Ai, t],
where Ai is the unobserved individual ﬁxed eﬀects, Dit represents the reform and t is
time. Thus the outcome variable Y0it is same with or without the reform.
The main assumption of the ﬁxed eﬀects model is that the unobserved individual
ﬁxed eﬀects Ai are not depended on time,
E[Y0it|Ai, t] = α + λt + A′iη, (6)
where λt is the time spesiﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects and α is a constant. The eﬀect of the reform
φ is assumed to be constant and additive:
E[Y1it|Ai, t] = E[Y0it|Ai, t] + φ. (7)
The equations (6) and (7) together imply that
E[Yit|Ai, t, Dit] = α + λt + φDit + A′iη. (8)
Thus from the equation (8) I get the ﬁxed eﬀects model:
Yit = αi + λt + φDit + εi, (9)
where the error term is εit ≡ Y0it − E [Y0it | Ai, t] and αi ≡ α + A′iη is the estimated
individual speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀect, where α is a constant and A′iη is a vector of unobserved
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individual ﬁxed eﬀects.
I exploit the equation (9) in the estimation of the eﬀects of the DHS tax credit
reform on consumer prices. I use the ﬁxed eﬀects model with binary treatment in the
following equation:
Yit = αi + λt + φ1(After)1i + φ2(After)2i + εit, (10)
where the outcome variable Yit represents the logarithmic consumer prices of individual
ﬁrm's service i at time t, the constant λt is the estimated time speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀect,
(After)1i takes the value of one if individual i receives treatment in the ﬁrst period
after treatment (t = 2) and zero otherwise, and (After)2i takes the value of one if
individual i receives treatment in the second period after treatment (t = 3) and zero
otherwise. The coeﬃcients of binary treatment variables, φ1 and φ2, identify the eﬀect
of the reform on the outcome variable Yit. The constant αi ≡ α+A′iη is the estimated
individual-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀect, where α is a constant and A′iη is a vector of unobserved
individual ﬁxed eﬀects and εit is the i.i.d. error term.
The treatment eﬀects φ1 or φ2 are consistently estimated, when the individual ﬁxed
eﬀects αi are eliminated. I calculate the individual averages,
Yi = αi + λ¯+ φ1(After)1i + φ2(After)2i + ε¯i.
By subtracting averages to the equation (10), I get the equation:
Yit − Yi = (λt − λ¯) + φ1(After1i − After1i) + φ2(After2i − After2i) + (εit − ε¯i).
(11)
Thus deviations from means eliminates the individual ﬁxed eﬀects αi.
I apply post code-level clusters to present appropriate standard errors in the estima-
tion of the price eﬀects (Cameron & Miller, 2015). Cluster-robust standard errors do
not restrict heteroskedasticity and correlation within post code-level. Standard errors
are larger with clustering than without it, but clustering does not aﬀect the signiﬁcance
of the results.
Next, I show why I use turnover as an outcome variable in the demand analysis. The
best case scenario for studying the eﬀects of the domestic help services tax credit on
demand, would be to have data which includes the information about consumer prices of
services and the quantity of sold services by ﬁrm. In spite of the large and comprehensive
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Tax Administration data from Finland and Sweden, I do not have information about
consumer prices and quantity of sold services. In general very detailed data of consumer
prices and quantities sold are seldom available. Therefore I have to use the second best
option, where I calculate the value of turnover from total sales of the ﬁrm, as I show
earlier in Section 4.2.
I can use turnover to analyze the eﬀects of the DHS tax credit on demand. Turnover
is consumer prices P multiplied by the quantity of sales Q:
Y = P ∗Q. (12)
The demand eﬀects, i.e. the amount of quantity change, only occur if consumer prices
or turnover change. Because demand and supply are in the equilibrium condition (2),
quantities purchased are same than quantities sold. Therefore quantities sold by ﬁrm
can be used on the demand analysis. If there are no changes in turnover or prices after
the DHS tax credit reforms, there cannot be any demand eﬀects of the DHS tax credit.
The theory of tax incidence imply that consumer prices should decrease if the amount
of the DHS tax credit declines and vice versa if the DHS tax credit increases. Therefore
if consumer prices change and the quantity remains same, turnover would change by
the amount of the price change. If turnover changed more than the amount of the price
change, the quantity have to change also. Then the demand eﬀects occur.
Mathematically the change can be studied by taking the partial derivatives of
turnover Y with respect to price P and quantity Q. The partial derivative with re-
spect to price P is
dY
dP
=
dY
dP
dP
dP
+
dY
dQ
dQ
dP
= Q+ P
dQ
dP
. (13)
The elasticity of demand  is  = dQ/Q
dP/P
= P
Q
dQ
dP
=⇒ Q
P
= dQ
dP
=⇒  = dQ
dP
P
Q
. I
substitute  to equation (13) and now I have the equation:
dY
dP
= Q+ P
Q
P
= Q+ Q = Q(1 + ). (14)
The equation (14) shows that the eﬀect of the price change on turnover depends on
the elasticity of demand. If the demand is elastic and the price increases, turnover
decreases and if the demand is inelastic, turnover increases when the price increases.
Therefore turnover is a relevant variable for analyzing the eﬀects of the DHS tax credit
on demand.
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In the demand analyses I use the DD approach for identifying the eﬀects of the
reforms. The main assumption of the DD method is the parallel time trends of treat-
ment and control group before the reform. The similar time trends in both groups
before the reform enables the comparison of the groups in the absence of the reform.
Thus the diﬀerence between the treatment and control group after the reform indicates
the treatment eﬀect. The study of similar time trends requires panel data, which con-
tains observations from both treatment and control groups before the reform and also
observations after the reform. I have relevant data from both Finnish and Swedish
ﬁrms.
The reason why I choose Swedish ﬁrms as a control group is not necessarily clear.
Particularly when I am interested in the reforms of the DHS tax credit system in
Finland. The Finnish ﬁrms in tax credited industries are a natural choice as a treatment
group. Whereas I cannot use Finnish ﬁrms as a control group. The DHS tax credit
system is in use in the speciﬁc industries in Finland, i.e. the DHS tax credit can be
applied for certain services from these industries' ﬁrms. It is not reasonable to compare
the DHS tax credited ﬁrms to non-tax credited ﬁrms within industries, because the DHS
tax credited services oﬀer certain types of ﬁrms in the industry. The other ﬁrms in the
same industry, whose services do not include in the DHS tax credit system, do not have
same characteristics than those ﬁrms which oﬀer the DHS tax credited services. For
that reason I use the Swedish ﬁrms from the same industries as Finland, as a control
group. In Sweden the tax credit system is similar than in Finland, yet in Sweden there
has not been any changes in the percentage or total maximum amount of the DHS tax
credit between 2007 and 2014, that is, the period I am focusing on. Consequently, the
treatment only aﬀects the treatment group and the control group are not aﬀected.
On the other hand, are the Swedish ﬁrms a more appropriate control group to
the Finnish ﬁrms than the Finnish non-tax credited ﬁrms? To compare two diﬀerent
countries' ﬁrms to each other, I have to acknowledge that there are no macroeconomic
shocks or diﬀerences in the background. Time trends before and after the reform can
be aﬀected by these shocks or diﬀerences.
As I described in Section 4.1, the macroeconomic indicators have been developing
similarly in Finland and Sweden in 2006-2013. Also the macroeconomic trends have
been close to similar in the DHS tax credited industries in both countries. Even though
macroeconomic indicators can change in the long run, it is not a problem in my analyses,
because I focus on relatively short time periods, i.e. year before and after the reform.
Moreover, macroeconomic shocks as themselves are not an issue. For instance, the
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economic crisis in 2009 impacted similar way in both countries. For these reasons the
Swedish ﬁrms can be used as a control group in my analyses.
Thus the idea behind the DD approach is to compare treatment group to control
group and estimate the diﬀerence between these groups after the reform. Next I intro-
duce mathematically a diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences model which I exploit in a regression
diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences method.
The DD model is based on the assumption that the treatment does not aﬀect the
control group. Therefore if there is no observed treatment, I can assume that
E[Y0ict|c, t] = γc + λt, (15)
where Y0ict is an outcome variable of ﬁrm i at time t in the control country c, the constant
γc is a time-invariant country eﬀect and the constant λt is a mutual time speciﬁc eﬀect.
The equation (15) denotes that if there is no treatment eﬀect, the outcome variable is
the sum of the time-invariant country eﬀect and the mutual time speciﬁc eﬀect.
In the presence of the treatment, the dummy Dct represents the treatment in coun-
try c at time t. The dummy gets the value of one if the ﬁrm is in the treatment
country at time after treatment. The estimate δ denotes the diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences
E [Y1ict − Y0ict | c, t], where variable Y1ict is the outcome variable of ﬁrm i at time t in
the treatment country and Y0ict is the the outcome variable of ﬁrm i at time t in the
control country. The DD model is
Yict = γc + λt + δDct + εict, (16)
where Yict is the outcome variable of ﬁrm i in the country c at time t and εict is the
independent and identically distributed error term, E(εict | c, t) = 0.
The diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences can be written:
E[Y1ict − Y0ict|c, t] = {E[Yict|c = Treatment, t = 1)]− E[Yict|c = Treatment, t = 0]}
−{E[Yict|c = Control, t = 1)]− E[Yict|c = Control, t = 0]} = δ.
Thus the diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences estimate is the causal eﬀects of interest. The DD
model provides the estimate of the treatment eﬀects and in addition the constants
provide also unobserved country- and time-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects.
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I apply the DD model as a regression diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences method to estimate
the eﬀects of the DHS tax credit reform on turnover. In the regression DD method I
compare turnover between the treatment group and the control group over time. I use
the regression DD method with ﬁrm ﬁxed-eﬀects in the following equation:
Yict = αi + β11(Treat)ic + β21(After)t + β31(Treatic ∗ Aftert) + β4Xict + εict, (17)
where the outcome variable Yict represents VAT exclusive logartihmic turnover of ﬁrm i
at time t in the country c, the constant αi is the estimated ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects, 1(Treat)ic
takes the value of one for the ﬁrm in the treatment country and zero otherwise,
1(After)t takes the value of one after the reform and zero otherwise, and 1(Treatic ∗
Aftert) represents the interaction variable of these two variables. The variable 1(Treatic∗
Aftert) is the same as the variable Dct in the DD model and the coeﬃcient of the inter-
action variable β3 identiﬁes the eﬀect of the reform on the outcome variable Yict. Xict
is a vector of relevant ﬁrm-level controls and εit is the i.i.d. error term.
I use the ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects for controlling the individual diﬀerences over time within
ﬁrm, because I have data which contains turnover of same ﬁrm over time both before
and after the reform. The ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects then control the unobserved individual
eﬀects which are persistent over time. Thus the omitted variable bias gets smaller.
As a result the estimate β3 represents the average proportional change in outcome
variable in consequence of the reform. The estimate of the interaction variable β3 is the
diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences estimate, as δ in the DD model:
β3 = {E[Yict|Treatc = FIN, t = 1)]− E[Yict|Treatc = FIN, t = 0]}
−{E[Yict|Treatc = SWE, t = 1)]− E[Yict|Treatc = SWE, t = 0]}.
As I presented earlier, the DD approach has its limitations, which have to be con-
sidered carefully. For using the regression DD method, fundamental assumptions are
parallel time trends and that the reform only aﬀects the treatment group. Furthermore,
I have to consider a possible serial correlation problem when I present the standard er-
rors of the estimates. Bertrand et al. (2004) and Cameron & Miller (2015) present
alternative estimation methods for solving the serial correlation problem. I calculate
cluster-robust standard errors for each estimation. I clustered ﬁrms by 5-digit industrial
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classiﬁcation codes in Finland and Sweden. Therefore cluster-robust standard errors
allow correlation and heteroskedasticity within industry per country. Cluster-robust
standard errors are larger than OLS standard errors but the signiﬁcance of the results
is not be aﬀected.
5 Results
5.1 Price Responses
I begin my analysis of the eﬀects of the changes in the DHS tax credit by estimating the
price responses. Theoretically, the DHS tax credit should aﬀect the consumer prices
of services. In Section 2.1, I present the pass-through method for analyzing the price
eﬀects. Although the pass-through is commonly used method to measure tax incidence,
I cannot directly use it to measure tax incidence of the DHS tax credit. In the empirical
literature, the pass-through has been mostly used to measure, for instance, the eﬀects of
the VAT changes (eg. Harju & Kosonen, 2013; Kosonen, 2015; Marion & Muehlegger,
2011; Weyl & Fabinger, 2013). However, the DHS tax credit cannot directly identify as
a VAT change. Therefore I have to remodel the pass-through method for my analysis.
I study the price eﬀects of the DHS tax credit only in Finland, because I do not
have suitable data which contains the consumer prices of cleaning services from Sweden.
Another reason to study the price responses only in Finland is that the DHS tax credit
is provided in diﬀerent ways in Finland and Sweden. In Finland, consumers apply the
DHS tax credit in their personal income taxation; in Sweden, consumers get the DHS
tax credit directly, when they purchase services. Therefore the price incidence of the
DHS tax credit can be diﬀerent in Finland and Sweden.
I focus on the change in the domestic help services tax credit in 2012. The amount
of the DHS tax credit was reduced from 60 % to 45 % on the ﬁrst of January 2012. I
study the price eﬀect of this change using the consumer prices of cleaning services. I use
the proportional change in consumer prices to estimate price eﬀects of the reduced DHS
tax credit. I have to make some restrictive assumptions in order to calculate the price
eﬀects. I assume that the producer price of services φ, quantities sold and the price
that consumer pays h before and after the change are ﬁxed. Also there are no change
in VAT t. The consumer price p is p = φ(1 + t). The real price which a consumer pays
after the DHS tax credit is the consumer price minus the DHS tax credit τ . It is given
by h = p− τ , from which I get the consumer price p = h+ τ .
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I study the price eﬀects of the change in the DHS tax credit, therefore I calculate
consumer prices before and after the change in the DHS tax credit. The DHS tax credit
before the change is τb = pb0.6− 100 and after the change τa = pa0.45− 100, where
100 is the own liability of the DHS tax credit. Now I have the tax inclusive consumer
prices before and after the change. Hence I can calculate the consumer price before the
change
hb = pb − τb =⇒ hb = pb − pb0.6− 100 =⇒ hb = (1− 0.6)pb − 100
=⇒ hb = 0.4pb − 100 =⇒ 0.4pb = hb + 100 =⇒ pb = hb + 100
0.4
,
and after the change
ha = pa − τa =⇒ ha = pa − pa0.45− 100 =⇒ ha = (1− 0.45)pa − 100
=⇒ ha = 0.55pa − 100 =⇒ 0.55pa = ha + 100 =⇒ pa = ha + 100
0.55
.
.
The proportional change is given by
∆p =
pa − pb
pb
∗ 100 = x%, (18)
which is the upper bound for price eﬀect if the producer price φ and VAT t are ﬁxed
and the price a consumer pays is h = hb = ha. Because the DHS tax credit can be
applied only to labor costs, material prices are not aﬀected by changes in the DHS tax
credit. As a result, I can calculate the proportional change:
∆p =
ha+100
0.55
− hb+100
0.4
hb+100
0.4
∗ 100 =⇒ ∆p =
h+100
0.55
− h+100
0.4
h+100
0.4
∗ 100
=⇒ ∆p =
1
0.55
− 1
0.4
1
0.4
∗ 100 = −27.27%.
The change in the DHS tax credit can theoretically reduce consumer prices 27.27 %.
Before the empirical estimation, I study the price eﬀects with ﬁgures. Figure 6
visualizes consumer price index trends of cleaning services between 2011 and 2013 (OSF,
2015; SCB, 2015b). It shows that consumer price index of cleaning services has increased
over time in Finland. In Sweden there are some small changes in both directions but
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main trend have been slightly increasing. The Swedish consumer price index data is at
the monthly level and Finnish data is at the quarterly level. I calculate the quarterly
consumer price index also from Swedish data and use that in the analysis. In Swedish
data there was a large drop in CPI in August 2011. It smooths when a three months
average is taken.
In addition, I calculate the percent change of cleaning services prices from the con-
sumer price index which I present in Figure 6. I calculate the percent change by using
the equation
∆CPI =
CPItime − CPIbasetime
CPIbasetime
∗ 100 = x%.
Thus I can better analyze and compare the changes in consumer prices between coun-
tries. Figure 7 shows that consumer prices changed more in Finland just after the
implementation of the DHS tax credit reform in 2012. Before 2012 the consumer price
index was at the same level in both countries. However, Figure 7 shows only the gen-
eral trends of consumer price index in cleaning services. I cannot reach any signiﬁcant
conclusions about the price eﬀects with these ﬁgures. Nevertheless, they provide some
information about the cleaning services consumer prices in both countries.
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Figure 6: Consumer price index for cleaning services in Finland and Sweden in 2011-
2013. Vertical line indicates the time of the reform.
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In the empirical estimation, I use ﬁrm-level survey data of cleaning services consumer
prices to evaluate price eﬀects in Finland. I do not have suitable data of Swedish
cleaning ﬁrms. Another reason why I do not use Swedish data is that the DHS tax
credit is provided in diﬀerent ways in Finland and Sweden. The Finnish survey data
contains cleaning services prices per hour in diﬀerent days of the week, as I described
in Section 4.2. Table 9 shows that a OLS regression in column (1) does not provide
good estimates of consumer prices. To eliminate the omitted variable bias, I use a ﬁxed
eﬀects method to estimate the percentage change in consumer prices. The results of
ﬁxed eﬀects estimates are presented in Table 9 in columns (2) and (3). The ﬁxed eﬀects
estimators are statistically signiﬁcant and the coeﬃcient of determination is larger than
in the OLS regression (R2 = 0.328). The estimated impact on consumer prices, because
of the DHS tax credit reduction, is a 2.1 % increase at time t = 2 and 5.3 % increase
at time t = 3 in prices.
The theory of tax incidence implies that the DHS tax credit reduction should reduce
consumer prices 27.27 %, if the producer price φ, quantities sold and the price h, which
the consumer pays after the DHS tax credit, is ﬁxed to same as it was before the
reform. The analysis shows that consumer prices do not decrease as the theory implies.
Instead, the estimation results present that consumer prices increase after the domestic
help services tax credit reform.
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Table 9: OLS and ﬁxed eﬀects estimates of log consumer prices
OLS FE FE clustered
(Std. Err.) (Std. Err.) ( Rob. Std. Err.)
(1) (2) (3)
After1 0.016 0.021∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.003) (0.004)
After2 0.068∗∗∗ 0.053∗∗∗ 0.053∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.003) (0.008)
Intercept 3.523∗∗∗ 3.525∗∗∗ 3.525∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.002) (0.004)
N 1320 1320 1320
R2 0.013 0.328 0.328
Standard errors in parentheses
∗∗∗p < 0.01,∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
There can be several reasons why the estimation results diﬀer from the theory
implications. First, there can be problems with data. The number of observations can
be too small in the cleaning services price data. More comprehensive data can improve
the analysis. Second, the estimation method can be unsuitable for analyzing the eﬀects
of the DHS tax credit reform. For instance, a diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences method and
a control group can be more appropriate model to estimate the reform. Third, it
is possible, that ﬁrms and consumers do not respond the DHS tax credit reduction.
Fourth, the assumptions that the producer price φ, quantities sold and the price which
consumer pays h are ﬁxed is not necessary be fulﬁlled. The reduction of consumer
price is smaller than the theory implies if the producer price could change. The price
h and quantities sold have to change also if the producer price change. Fifth, the
theory implications can be diﬀerent than my calculation of the proportional change if
the elasticities of demand and supply are very elastic or inelastic. For instance, if the
supply is very elastic, the reduction of the DHS tax credit does not change consumer
prices as much as the theory implies. Also my calculation does not take into account
the elasticities as the pass-through does. And last, cleaning services markets can be
distorted and in some reasons markets are not necessary perfectly competed.
The imperfect competition in the cleaning services markets can change the theory
implications of the DHS tax credit reduction. Consumer prices can change less after
the reform if markets are characterized by imperfect competition. In Section 2.1 I show
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how the pass-through diﬀers if markets are perfectly or imperfectly competitive. I do
not use the pass-through in this section, instead I calculate the proportional change
in consumer prices. The calculation of the proportional change does not take into
account imperfect competition. Therefore if cleaning services markets are imperfectly
competed, the theory implications can be diﬀerent than my calculations. However, the
imperfect competition should not shift the theory implications so much that the DHS
tax credit reduction would increase consumer prices. Consequently, cleaning services
markets conditions do not entirely explain the diﬀerence between the estimation results
and the theory implications.
5.2 Demand
I study the eﬀects of the DHS tax credit reform on demand using three diﬀerent ap-
proaches. First, I analyze the eﬀects of the DHS tax credit reform in all tax credited
industries. Second, I concentrate on the construction and cleaning industries, because
those industries cover around 98 % of the DHS tax credit applications in 2006-2013 (see
Table 6). Also the DHS tax credit reforms can aﬀect diﬀerently in construction ﬁrms
than in cleaning ﬁrms. Third, I divide ﬁrms into two diﬀerent groups depending on the
location of the ﬁrm, i.e. is the ﬁrm located in the capital or not, since the markets can
be more competitive in the capital than in other areas. In these analyses, I focus on
the domestic help services tax credit reforms in 2009 and 2012.
At the beginning, I analyze the eﬀects on demand by presenting the development
of the outcome variable over time, VAT exclusive turnover. Figure 8 shows trends of
average monthly turnover in construction and cleaning ﬁrms between 2006 and 2013
in Finland and Sweden. Figure 8 visualizes that there are similar variation in each
year over time in cleaning industry. However, there is more variation between years in
construction industry, especially in Finland. Consistently, turnover is its lowest level
in cleaning industry in each year July and in construction industry in January. In my
analysis, I have to take into consideration the variation between months because the
variation complicates the interpretation of the estimation results.
To smooth out monthly variation and to observe the changes in the outcome variable,
I estimate the predicted values of the log of turnover. Turnover indicates the propor-
tional change, therefore the deviations from zero demonstrate percentage changes. I
use the prediction with individual ﬁxed eﬀects E[yjs|xjs, αi], where j = 1, . . . , N and s
is time. A regressor xjs equals one if j = i and zero otherwise. The predictor is then
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Figure 8: Average VAT exclusive turnover over time of a) construction ﬁrms and b)
cleaning ﬁrms in Finland and Sweden. Vertical lines indicate the reforms of the DHS
tax credit in Finland.
ŷi,t+s = x
′
itβ̂W + α̂i,FE and the error term is ui + eit which includes the ﬁxed-error and
the overall error components. Often the predicted values is referred to as the ﬁtted
values because they are the estimate of the mean. Moreover, in the regression of the
predicted values, I use a few control variables such as an indicator of month, a tax re-
porting period, ﬁrm's legal form and industry classiﬁcations. I use several time periods
to estimate the predicted values since the predictor is only consistent in the long panel
data. (Cameron & Trivedi 2005, 738.)
I restrict the data in following ways. I only investigate ﬁrms with positive turnover
in every month. Therefore I do not examine ﬁrms' entries and exits. This restriction
eliminates total 9291 ﬁrms in years 2008-2009 and 2011-2012. I also restricted data to
cover only ﬁrms which do not have over 100 % changes in turnover from year to year,
i.e. the diﬀerence ym − ym−12, where m is month, is less than 100 %. This restriction
eliminates 141991 of 406511 ﬁrms in 2008-2009 and 167837 of 459729 ﬁrms in 2011-2012.
The eliminated ﬁrms are, for instance, smaller ﬁrms which have large yearly variation
of turnover, even though these changes are relatively small in euros. Furthermore the
estimation period in the DD estimation was limited to cover one year before and after
the reforms. Thus the estimation only produce the short-run eﬀects of the DHS tax
credit reforms on demand. A longer time period could cause problems, because the
reforms have been implemented close to each other.
First, I estimate the eﬀects of the DHS tax credit reforms on turnover in all tax
credited industries. Figure 9 illustrates estimated turnover trends over time. The
horizontal axis is quarters from the reform, where zero is the time of the reform. Figure
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9 shows that before the reforms, in 2008 and 2011, turnover trends have been similar,
hence the main assumption of the DD approach, parallel time trends before the reform,
is fulﬁlled. However, turnover trends are more volatile in 2008-2009 than in 2011-2012.
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Figure 9: Estimated VAT exclusive turnover of all Finnish and Swedish ﬁrms in DHS
tax credited industries. Vertical lines indicate the DHS tax credit reforms in Finland.
Note: Conﬁdence intervals are so small that they can barely see in the ﬁgures.
Figure 9a presents that immediately after the reform in 2009 the turnover trends
separate to each other. However, the eﬀect is only short-time and the lines are united
two quarters after the reform. Furthermore turnover is larger in three quarters after
the reform in Sweden. Also there is no clear increase in turnover after the reform in
Finland. Therefore the impact of the reform is not explicit even though turnover reduce
more in Sweden just after the reform. The reduction of turnover is considerable large
in Sweden just after the reform in 2009. I try to ﬁnd the reason for the reduction from
data but I cannot identify any outlying observations that could cause the reduction.
The reduction is also visible in Figures 10a and 11a.
Figure 9b shows that after the reform in 2012, the diﬀerence between Finland and
Sweden are smaller than in 2009.Turnover does not decrease after the reform in Finland,
but it increases more in Sweden which indicates that there is a weak negative eﬀect of
the reform on turnover. Nevertheless, the eﬀect is short-time, only three quarters long.
Second, I conducted the estimations separately to construction and cleaning in-
dustries. Figure 10 illustrates the estimated turnover in construction and cleaning
industries in 2008-2009 and 2011-2012. Turnover trends are identical before the re-
forms in 2011 in both industries and almost similar in 2008. Figure 10a presents that
turnover trend is more messy in the construction industry than in cleaning industry.
There are also diﬀerences in industries after the reforms. The cleaning ﬁrms' turnover
41
−
.
1
−
.
05
0
.
05
.
1
−4 −3 −2 −1 0 1 2 3
Quarters from the first observation after the reform
Finland  
Sweden  
construction firms
Estimated VAT exclusive log turnover
−
.
1
−
.
05
0
.
05
.
1
−4 −3 −2 −1 0 1 2 3
Quarters from the first observation after the reform
Finland  
Sweden  
construction firms
Estimated VAT exclusive log turnover
−
.
1
−
.
05
0
.
05
.
1
−4 −3 −2 −1 0 1 2 3
Quarters from the first observation after the reform
Finland  
Sweden  
cleaning firms
Estimated VAT exclusive log turnover
−
.
1
−
.
05
0
.
05
.
1
−4 −3 −2 −1 0 1 2 3
Quarters from the first observation after the reform
Finland  
Sweden  
cleaning firms
Estimated VAT exclusive log turnover
a) 2008-2009 b) 2011-2012
Figure 10: Estimated VAT exclusive turnover of the construction and cleaning ﬁrms
in Finland and Sweden. Vertical lines indicate the DHS tax credit reforms in Finland.
Note: Conﬁdence intervals are so small that they can barely see in the ﬁgures.
has increased after the reform in 2009 which indicates a positive impact of the reform.
Whereas the construction ﬁrms' turnover has decreased in both countries but less in
Finland than in Sweden. The eﬀect is shorter in construction than cleaning industry.
The construction ﬁrms can be more aﬀected by the 2009 economic crisis, therefore
turnover can decrease in both countries even if the amount of the DHS tax credit has
been increased in Finland.
Figure 10b shows that turnover has decreased more after the reform in cleaning
industry than in construction industry. Furthermore the eﬀect of the reform is longer
in cleaning industry. However, in the construction industry turnover has increased more
in Sweden than in Finland which indicates that there is a weak negative impact of the
reform.
Third, I divided ﬁrms into two groups. The ﬁrst group includes ﬁrms which are
located in the capital, i.e. in Helsinki, Espoo or Vantaa in Finland and in Stockholm in
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Figure 11: Estimated VAT exclusive turnover of all ﬁrms in DHS tax credited industries
in the capital and outside the capital in Finland and Sweden. Vertical lines indicate
the DHS tax credit reforms in Finland. Note: Conﬁdence intervals are so small that
they can barely see in the ﬁgures.
Sweden. The second group contains ﬁrms outside the capital. I study areas separately
because the ﬁrms can have diﬀerent competition circumstances in the capital than
outside it. Especially, in Sweden almost 30 % of all construction or cleaning ﬁrms
are located in Stockholm. Figure 11 illustrates estimated turnover in 2008-2009 and
2011-2012 in diﬀerent areas. Figure 11 shows that there is no large diﬀerence between
location. All in all turnover trends are close to similar than in Figure 9 where there is
no division. Overall, ﬁgures do not reveal any clear impacts of the reform which would
support the theory predictions.
After the graphical investigation, I present the estimation results. Table 10 shows
the diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences estimates of predicted VAT exclusive log turnover for the
reform in 2009. I use monthly level data in estimations. Column (1) presents the results
of all ﬁrms in DHS tax credited industries. The model is without controls because the
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Table 10: DD estimates of predicted VAT exclusive log turnover, the reform in 2009
All Industry Metropolitan
Simple Construction Cleaning Yes No
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
DD 0.0044 -0.0270∗∗∗ 0.0080 -0.0079 -0.0087
(0.0181) (0.0081) (0.0070) (0.0089) (0.0073)
After -0.0239∗∗∗ -0.0249∗∗∗ -0.0088∗∗ -0.0202∗∗∗ -0.0252∗∗∗
(0.00183) (0.0020) (0.0044) (0.0025) (0.0020)
N 3131443 1175581 812274 661768 2469675
R2 0.0000 0.0003 0.0022 0.0005 0.0005
N of ﬁrms 186278 73898 47119 40597 145891
Standard errors in parentheses
∗∗∗p < 0.01,∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
Swedish data set is unclear as for controls. The time variation is controlled by using the
predicted VAT exclusive log turnover as an outcome variable. The simple model does
not produce any signiﬁcant results of the DD estimate. Columns (2) and (3) present
the DD results at the industry-level. The results diﬀer from each other in construction
and cleaning industries. The DD result in column (2) indicates that construction ﬁrms'
turnover decrease 2.70 % due to the reform and the estimate is statistically signiﬁcant.
Whereas the eﬀect is not statistically signiﬁcant in cleaning industry. Columns (4) and
(5) show that the results, divided by ﬁrms' location, are not statistically signiﬁcant.
The lack of the signiﬁcant results can arise from messy time trends of turnover in
2008-2009. The time variation were diﬃcult to smooth even if I use several controls in
the prediction. The macroeconomic situation in 2009 can be a reason for large variation
in turnover trends. The unusual economic circumstances, as the economic crisis in 2009,
can aﬀect ﬁrms' behavior abnormally, hence it can complicated the analysis. Especially,
in cleaning and construction industries the eﬀects of the economic crisis on the demand
for services can be diﬀerent. Moreover, the Swedish DHS tax credit system has changed
in 2008-2009 which could aﬀect the results. In December 2008 the ROT deduction was
included to the DHS tax credit system and in July 2009 the direct invoicing system
was introduced and hiring an employee at home became tax credited. Overall, I cannot
make trustworthy interpretation about the eﬀects of the DHS tax credit reform on
turnover. Nevertheless, if I could have relevant control variables for the estimation and
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reducing the time variation, at least the quality of the results could improve. Naturally,
it would not remove the problem of the changes in the Swedish tax credit system.
Theoretically an increase of the DHS tax credit could improve the demand for ser-
vices. The interpretation of my empirical results is that the DHS tax credit reform
has no impact on turnover, because the results are not statistically signiﬁcant. Nev-
ertheless, I cannot reach any reliable conclusions that the DHS tax credit reform has
aﬀected demand since I have not conducted the analysis of the eﬀects of the reform
on consumer prices. As I show in Section 4.2 that the demand changes only occur if
turnover or consumer prices changes.
Table 11 presents the DD results of the DHS tax credit reform in 2012. Column (1)
shows the DD results of all ﬁrms in DHS tax credited industries. The results indicate
that ﬁrms' turnover decline 1.16 % due to the reform in 2012. Column (2) presents that
the eﬀect of the reform for construction ﬁrms is 2.32 % decrease in turnover. Instead
the DD results of cleaning ﬁrms are not statistically signiﬁcant. Columns (4) and (5)
show that the results, divided by ﬁrms' location, are statistically signiﬁcant and the
impact of the reform for ﬁrms in the capital is 1.35 % reduction and outside the capital
1.09 % reduction in turnover.
Table 11: DD estimates of predicted VAT exclusive log turnover, the reform in 2012
All Industry Metropolitan
Simple Construction Cleaning Yes No
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
DD -0.0116∗∗ -0.0232∗∗∗ -0.0207 -0.0135∗∗ -0.0109∗
(0.0056) (0.0089) (0.0135) (0.0056) fns(0.0058)
After -0.0025 -0.0047∗∗ 0.0098∗∗∗ -0.0004 -0.0033∗∗
(0.0017) (0.0020) (0.0033) (0.0028) (0.0017)
N 3586572 1304386 989496 781322 2805250
R2 0.0011 0.0014 0.0009 0.0003 0.0011
N of ﬁrms 228141 80509 55659 46272 162058
Standard errors in parentheses
∗∗∗p < 0.01,∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
The results are in line with theory predictions which imply that the DHS tax credit
reduction should decrease the demand for services. The results indicate that the DHS
tax credit reform in 2012 has reduced turnover from 1.09 % to 2.32 % depending on ﬁrms
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location and industry. In the previous section, I show that consumer prices of cleaning
services have increased 2.1-5.3 % after the reform in 2012. However, the results of the
turnover estimation is not statistically signiﬁcant in the cleaning industry. Therefore
cleaning ﬁrms turnover does not change due to the reform. Since turnover is consumer
prices times quantities sold and there were positive change in consumer prices and
no change in turnover, quantities sold have to decrease. The demand changes occur.
Nonetheless, the strong conclusions from the results should not be done because the
analysis of consumer prices covers only prices of cleaning services and not any other
services. Thus I cannot evaluate the eﬀects of the DHS tax credit reform in other
industries even though the results show a reduction of turnover.
To validate my emprical results, I should conduct robustness checks for the esti-
mations. The placebo tests and using the control variables could improve the quality
of the results. However, in this study there has been an availability problem with the
Swedish data. Therefore I do not have relevant control variables in the Swedish data
sets which I could use. On the other hand, I could perform the placebo tests, where I
carry out same estimations than before, by setting the reform take place, for instance,
year before or after the real reform. In this study of the DHS tax credit reforms, there
can be three problems in the placebo estimations. First, it is not reasonable to conduct
placebo tests a year after the reform because the DHS tax credit reforms can have long-
run eﬀects on demand. It is possible that consumers react slowly on the changes in the
system and hence the eﬀects can occur later than year after the reform. Second, the
Finnish domestic help services tax credit system have been changed many times and
these changes have been implemented near to each other. Therefore I argue that per-
forming the placebo tests year before the reform is not wise since it could only capture
the eﬀects of the previous reform. Third, in Sweden there was no DHS tax credit system
before 2007 hence the placebo tests cannot carry out by setting the reform before 2008
from which I get back to second problem. Without the robustness checks, the results
are only tentative.
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6 Concluding Remarks
In this thesis I focus on the domestic help services tax credit reforms in Finland. Es-
pecially, I concentrate on the Finnish government's motivation to increase the demand
for domestic help services. I aim to provide an empirical analysis of the eﬀects of the
domestic help services tax credit reforms on the demand for services in Finland. In
addition, I investigate the price responses of the DHS tax credit reforms on Finnish
cleaning ﬁrms since the demand eﬀects can only occur if consumer prices of services or
ﬁrms' turnover change.
I examine the Finnish DHS tax credit reform using the diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences
method and ﬁxed eﬀects estimation. I exploit ﬁrm-level data from both Finnish and
Swedish Tax Administrations. Both countries' data sets include information about
ﬁrms' VAT payments of sales and yearly level control variables and all DHS tax credit
applications from years 2006-2013. For the study of the price responses, I utilize data
which contains consumer prices of cleaning services. In the demand analysis, I use few
required data restrictions to smooth out the time variation of the turnover trends in
order to fulﬁll the identifying assumption of the DD method, the parallel time trends
without the treatment.
The empirical results of my study are not entirely consistent with the theory predic-
tions of the changes in the DHS tax credit. The results of the price responses suggest
that the DHS tax credit reform in 2012 increased the consumer prices of cleaning services
by 2.1-5.3 %. This results are not in line with the theory predictions. Theoretically,
the decrease in the domestic help services tax credit should reduce consumer prices
and also quantities purchased if supply does not shift. Moreover, the empirical results
of turnover analysis are more or less unclear. The results of the reform in 2012 are
consistent with the theory predictions, but without the robustness checks the quality of
the results are questionable. Turnover, excluded of VAT, decreased from 1.09 % to 2.32
% depending on ﬁrm location and industry after the reform in 2012. Since consumer
prices increased and turnover decreased or was unchanged due to reform, the quantities
sold must have changed also. However, I cannot conduct the analysis on consumer
prices in industries other than cleaning. Hence the interpretation of the eﬀects of the
DHS tax credit reform is incomplete. Conversely, the reform in 2009 did not aﬀect
turnover and I cannot perform the price analysis in that year. Therefore, I cannot
reach any conclusions of the eﬀects of the DHS tax credit increase on the demand for
and consumer prices of services.
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This study does not provide unambiguous results of the eﬀects of the DHS tax credit
reform on demand. However, the methods, which I apply, are relevant to analyze the
policy reforms, but the lack of good control variables and consumer price data reduce
the quality of the results. Better data, such as an information about quantities sold,
could produce better estimates and enable the analysis of the changes in demand. These
problems in the analyses prevent me from providing policy recommendations.
Overall, my results suggest that the DHS tax credit system is diﬃcult to study since
the system has been changed many times in Finland and Sweden and furthermore these
changes are implemented near to each other. Finding a suﬃciently long period without
changes in the DHS tax credit system is a challenge. Therefore I only investigate the
short-run eﬀects of the DHS tax credit reforms. However, the changes in the DHS tax
credit system can aﬀect demand also later than year after the reform because consumers
could notice the reform, for instance, over year later. Especially, in Finland the delayed
reaction is more possible since consumers do not apply the DHS tax credit in same
year than they purchase the services. Thus the study of long-run eﬀects could be more
productive than the estimation of short-run impacts. One possibility to study long-
time eﬀects is to utilize the Finnish DHS tax credit experiment of two diﬀerent variants
which was in used between 1997 and 2001. These variants would provide more than a
four year research period and a natural comparison of analyzing the eﬃciency of the
variants.
The demand analysis of this study also raises two questions, namely are the demand
eﬀects real or does demand change because of a decrease in the shadow economy and
do ﬁrms shift material costs to labor costs since the domestic help tax credit is applied
only to labor costs. The DHS tax credit can give incentives to convert undeclared work
to declared work and change the material costs to labor costs. Hence the real change
in demand is not necessarily what the estimates suggest. Meaningful demand analysis
could not be conducted without the examination of the ﬁrm's behavior. Furthermore
the possible eﬀects of the DHS tax credit on the shadow economy is the question which
could be studied.
My analysis contributes previous literature of the DHS tax credit in three ways.
First, I conduct the ﬁrst econometric analysis of the Finnish tax credit system. Previous
studies of the Finnish DHS tax credit have concentrated on the descriptive analysis.
Second, the DD approach has not been used before to estimate the eﬀects of the DHS
tax credit reforms on demand. The impact of the domestic help services tax credit on
demand has earlier studied only with simulation model (Flipo et al., 2007). They study
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an increase in the tax credit and conclude that the increase has improved the demand
for services. Therefore my results support previous studies since a decrease of the DHS
tax credit in 2012 reduced turnover and increased consumer prices which implies that
demand was also reduced. And last, this study is also the ﬁrst to analyze the eﬀects of
the DHS tax credit reform using both Finnish and Swedish data.
Many interesting questions remain without answers. Particularly, the Finnish gov-
ernment's other motivations for introducing the domestic help services tax credit could
provide interesting research topics. One motivation was to increase labor supply and
demand in the DHS tax credited industries. The potential employment eﬀects of the
DHS tax credit are a natural follow-up question from my study. Since if the demand
for services increases or decreases, employment should also change. However, data lim-
itations did not allow me to study the eﬀects of the DHS tax credit on employment.
Further studies using data of wage or labor costs or number of employees could be done.
All in all, this study is the ﬁrst analysis which attempts to evaluate the eﬀects of
the Finnish domestic help services tax credit reforms. Even if my empirical analysis
of the demand eﬀects does not provide coherent results, the study is the opening for
forthcoming research. Furthermore, the impacts of services tax credits could be inves-
tigated by using data from other countries, which have implemented a domestic help
or other form of services tax credit. Thus the understanding of the eﬀects of the tax
instruments, such as tax credits, could broaden.
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A Description of Survey Data
The survey data of consumer prices of cleaning services is collected by VATT Institute
for Economic Research. Consumer prices was collected from randomly chosen Finnish
cleaning ﬁrms in three diﬀerent time points: end of 2011 (t=1), beginning of 2012
(t=2) and end of 2012 or beginning of 2013 (t=3). The survey data contains consumer
prices from 192 cleaning ﬁrms. The price collection was made by phone or via the
internet. The collection questionnaires contains 13 characteristic and 9 price questions.
All 9 prices of services were collected in every time points from each ﬁrms. All prices
are presented in Table 12. Questions of ﬁrms' characteristic collected the information
about, e.g. does the ﬁrm belong to chain or not, does the ﬁrm have a facebook page,
what is the quality of ﬁrm's web page and can a consumer use a service voucher for
purchasing services.
Table 12: Prices1-9
Price1: Cleaning from Monday to Wednesday
Price2: Cleaning from Thursday to Friday
Price3: Cleaning on Saturday
Price4: Cleaning on Sunday
Price5: Price1 after the DHS tax credit
Price6: Sale price of cleaning services
Price7: Kilometre allowance (xD/km)
Price8: Price of oﬃce cleaning
Price9: Price of construction cleaning
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